Elizabeth Anscombe and an argument  against contraception by Mccarthy, Anthony
logos_i_ethos_2019_2_(50), s. 47–65
Anthony McCarthy
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3420-5605
International Theological Institute
Elizabeth Anscombe and an argument 
against contraception
The phenomenologist Aurel Kol-
nai, in his little-known book Sexual 
Ethics: The Meaning and Founda-
tions of  Sexual Morality, provides 
us  with the following thoughts re-
garding the virtue of chastity:
When we  refer to  a  person’s cus-
tomary and lasting ‘disposition’ in  the 
fulfillment of  the moral demands 
of a particular sphere of value, we talk 
about the relevant ‘virtue.’ A man has the virtue of chastity when, inter alia, he nor-
mally refrains from certain kinds of sin and when he considers and deals with ques-
tions of sex with the seriousness they deserve […] Apart from particular actions 
which have important social consequences, society is more interested in virtue than 
in the isolated decisions, or moral turning points of its members […] For the fate 
of a person’s innermost being, the salvation of his soul, is of less social concern than 
the ‘image’ others can have of him, the fixed quantity, as it were, which represents 
the person they have to reckon with.1
 1 A. Kolnai, Sexual Ethics: The Meaning and Foundations of Sexual Morality, Aldershot 2005, 
p. 242.
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Like Kolnai, Elizabeth Anscombe certainly dealt with questions 
of sex – and indeed with many other questions – with the seriousness 
they deserve. I was recently reminded that the great philosopher Ber-
nard Williams, an opponent of Anscombe’s on this issue and others, said, 
in the last interview he gave before his death, on the subject of philosophy 
and those who influenced him, “Eliabeth conveyed a strong sense of the 
seriousness of the subject, and how the subject was difficult in ways that 
simply being clever wasn’t going to get round.”2
McCabe on contraception
With those words in mind, let me turn to the main focus of this paper: 
a debate on contraception over fifty years ago where Anscombe respond-
ed, in her article ‘Contraception and Natural Law,’ to an article in New 
Blackfriars by the Dominican scholar Fr Herbert McCabe. In his article, 
entitled ‘Contraceptives and Natural Law,’ Herbert McCabe proceeds 
to cast doubt on the claim that contraception is always in fact contrary 
to natural law. He tells us:
the theory of natural law is  that we are not isolated individuals, we are parts, 
fragments you might say, of a larger community, the human race. We did not opt 
to  join the human race; we came into existence by being born of  this race. Man-
kind […] is a reality prior to any living individual. The race as a whole has certain 
requirements if it is to survive as such, and, because we are its members, in some 
of our activities we act not simply as individuals fulfilling our private purposes, but 
as representatives of the race doing a job laid down for us by these requirements 
of the race.3
McCabe then outlines an  argument against contraception based 
on the idea that because some human activities have built-in functions 
concerning the requirements of mankind as a whole, and because such 
 2 A. Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics, Oxford 2011, p. 197.
 3 H. McCabe, Contraceptives and Natural Law, “New Blackfriars” 46 (1964) 533, p. 90.
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functions have an importance greater than any purpose an individual 
may have, interference with such built-in functions (in this case, the 
procreation of children) in such a way as to frustrate the function will 
always be morally wrong.
Note that in the paper McCabe seems to distinguish only, in refer-
ring to the purposes that individual people (or “fragments” of the hu-
man race) may have, between such purposes people happen to choose 
for themselves and the needs of humanity itself. Tellingly, he does not 
at this stage focus on the personal flourishing of individuals fulfilling 
their own telos in having children (and respecting their fertility), which 
is not  merely a good external to themselves.
It seems as though there are a number of problems with McCabe’s 
framework even before we  get to  his qualification of  the argument 
he starts with: a qualification which will ultimately, in his mind, under-
mine the natural law argument against contraception.
Anscombe rightly faults McCabe’s description of  natural law, say-
ing that “he connects the concept of natural law much too closely with 
the fact ‘that we are not isolated individuals, are parts, fragments […] 
of a larger community, the human race.”4 While such a connection to the 
human community may well be central to sins such as theft, this does 
not apply so much to some other areas of morality (Anscombe mentions 
a man of sound mind leading an unexamined life who is  nevertheless 
a good member of a decent community).
Right reason
In this, Anscombe appears to be much closer to Aquinas than the 
Thomist McCabe, for Aquinas objects to Aristotle’s thought that a prof-
ligate is not evil because he does not harm others, stating that “we say 
here that evil in general, is all that is repugnant to right reason.” (Summa 
Theologiae I-II, q18 a9 ad2) Anscombe concedes, however, that “among 
sexual sins, fornication and adultery are the ones that are, like theft 
 4 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Natural Law, “New Blackfriars” 46 (1965) 540, p. 517.
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among non-sexual sins, shown to  be wrong, i.e. against the natural 
law, by the role of what they have to do with – here sexuality, as there 
 property – in the community of the human race.”5
McCabe’s generalizing social framework, in contrast, would seem 
particularly ill-suited to addressing problematic sexual choices of certain 
other kinds, including contraception in at least some of its dimensions. 
For McCabe does not have an obvious way of distinguishing certain 
sexual sins – together with non-sexual sins of  intemperance – as dis-
tinct in kind from more obviously social sins such as theft. Still less does 
he have a way of identifying sexual sins as ethically ‘special,’ accounting 
for the sui generis experience of sexual sin that so concerns phenom-
enologists like Kolnai and von Hildebrand (interestingly the New Natu-
ral Lawyers, arguing as they see it from Thomist principles, are also less 
than ideally equipped to tackle such issues6). According to Kolnai, “It 
is because we experience sinful sexual experience itself in sexual sin, and 
not primarily the logical web of relations and their opposition, that there 
is inherent in [the] attitude of moral disapprobation an importance and 
absoluteness which has no parallel.”7 Moreover, St Paul in his first letter 
to the Corinthians (6.18) implores his readers to shun sexual immoral-
ity because, “All other sins a person commits are outside the body, but 
whoever sins sexually, sins against their own body.”
Sexual activity and sexual intercourse
McCabe claims that the argument he has thus far forwarded suffers 
from a fault in that it identifies sexual activity with sexual intercourse. 
And this is a mistake, because
 5 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 518.
 6 See for example A. McCarthy, Ethical Sex: Sexual Choices and Their Nature and Meaning, 
South Bend 2016.
 7 A. Kolnai, Sexual Ethics: The Meaning and Foundations of Sexual Morality, op. cit., p. 13.
51 Elizabeth Anscombe and an argument against contraception 
we cannot […] say that sexual intercourse is the precise subject of this function 
because intercourse itself will not bring about the continuance of the race in this 
way. In order that the race should continue it is necessary not merely that an ovum 
should be fertilized but that a child should be born, that it should survive after birth 
and receive a basic minimum initiation into the traditions of the community […] 
Mere intercourse separated from any activity to deal with the fertilized ovum [what 
McCabe could more accurately have called the human embryo] presents a difficulty 
for the race not an advantage […] What is required by the race therefore, is a whole 
complex of  acts […] This complex, then, must be  the sexual activity of  which 
we have been speaking. Intercourse is an important part of sexual activity but I do 
not see how it can be identified with it, and removed from its proper context it loses 
touch with its natural purpose.8
For McCabe, sexual intercourse is only a part of sexual activity (by 
which he seems to mean something more like marriage as a whole). For 
him, it seems possible that the complex nature of sexual or marital activ-
ity is such that if a ‘part’ of the activity in the form of sexual intercourse 
is interfered with and frustrated it does not necessarily follow that the 
built-in purpose of the whole is thereby wrongly suppressed. He suggests 
that if “contraceptive intercourse came to be regarded as in some cases 
legitimate, there would be an equally clear, well-established and recog-
nized distinction between the context which would make it a frustration 
of sexual activity and those in which it would not be so.”9 For McCabe, 
it is those with direct experience of the problems of married life who 
should decide what those conditions should be.
Elizabeth Anscombe, herself, as she mentions, a married woman with 
a career and a large family and not always prosperous and “familiar with 
the fear of having more children”10 would appear to fit the bill. As we 
have seen, this particular wife and mother is rather impatient with Mc-
Cabe’s strongly ‘social’ understanding of natural law, including in some 
 8 H. McCabe, Contraceptives and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 92–93.
 9 H. McCabe, Contraceptives and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 96.
 10 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 517.
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areas of sexual ethics. For while McCabe reasonably objects to adultery 
and fornication on social grounds, his approach does not supply him 
with any obvious objection to such activities as anal sex, as Anscombe 
points out. And he doesn’t appear to think that contraception is neces-
sarily ruled out either – though indeed one might make a very good ‘so-
cial’ case that it contributes to abortion through encouraging a negative 
attitude to the relationship between sex and the good of children. The 
frank admissions of some abortion promoters that contraception can 
decrease tolerance for unplanned pregnancy – together with the fact that 
many abortions do occur following contraception – bear this out very 
well.11 In later life McCabe underlined his belief that because “use of arti-
ficial contraceptives […] or homosexual acts or masturbation or in vitro 
fertilization” are not explicitly prohibited in the Decalogue it is an open 
question whether they should be seen as mortally sinful or absolutely 
wrong in themselves in the way that e.g. adultery is.12
McCabe appears to hold that an adulterous act is not merely a frag-
ment which lacks its proper context but is rather an act that is only analo-
gous to marital intercourse – it is not true marital activity at all (although 
of course, the fact that it resembles so closely a marital act, without being 
one, is precisely what makes it wrong). Such an understanding takes it as 
given that, as McCabe tells us elsewhere, “sex without marriage is just 
imitation marriage […] Love is not added to sex; sex without love, or sex 
with bogus or imitation love, is distorted in itself, one of its essential 
 elements is missing.”13
 11 See for example Women Cannot Control Fertility Through Contraception Alone, https://
www.bpas.org/about-our-charity/press-office/press-releases/women-cannot-control-fertili-
ty-through-contraception-alone-bpas-data-shows-1-in-4-women-having-an-abortion-were-
-using-most-effective-contraception/ (6.10.2019) and http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
-idx?c=acls;idno=heb00493.
 12 H. McCabe, Veritatis Splendor in focus: Manual and rule books, http://www.natural-law-and-
-conscience.org/readings/mccabe.asp (19.07.2017).
 13 H. McCabe, The New Creation, London 2010, p. 107–108.
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Contra naturam
This point is well taken, but the question arises why such a point would 
not also apply to (and apply a fortiori to) acts of what Anscombe calls 
‘unnatural vice.’ Anscombe is alert to the grave wrongness of such acts, re-
minding her readers that what distinguishes these acts is that they are not 
normal acts of intercourse: they are “per se unfitted to generate a child.”14 
For her, such acts are more basically and obviously wrong than the acts 
of adultery, say, which McCabe rules out as incapable of being legitimate 
steps within the complex ‘game’ or project of overall marital activity.15 
The distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ acts, held by much 
of the global population today, was defended by Immanuel Kant (some-
one about whom Anscombe is altogether too dismissive), when he wrote:
Since such transgressions of laws, called unnatural vice (criminal carnis contra 
naturam) or also unmentionable vices, do wrong to humanity in our own person, 
there are no limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can save them from being 
repudiated completely.16
Certainly it  is bizarre for McCabe to treat acts of non-procreative 
kind, including contraceptive sex, as in a more defensible category than 
adulterous acts of ‘imitation marriage’ which he rightly sees as distorted 
in themselves and not merely as genuine fragments which are ‘good in-
sofar as they go’ albeit lacking a proper context.17 With adultery at least, 
he would concede that such is the importance of each and every sexual 
act and the marital unity each act should express that it would be absurd 
 14 G. E. M. Anscombe Contraception and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 520.
 15 H. McCabe, Contraceptives and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 93–94. McCabe uses the analogy 
of football, where the purpose of the game is to score goals but where a back-pass may serve this 
overall end. 
 16 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge 1996, p. 62 (6.277). 
 17 The word fragment can used to single out a genuine part of a larger whole; in contrast, as with 
an amputated limb, it can be used to refer to something which is no longer a part of such a whole 
at all. 
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to say that an extramarital act or entire affair could be pursued if that 
were somehow in the interests of the marriage as a whole. An extramari-
tal sexual act is not a fragment good in itself, any more than an amputat-
ed limb is a working part of a human being. It is an act bad in itself, as it 
is lacking the element of marital commitment that is part of a marital act 
and not just part of the act’s ‘surroundings.’
But could not something very similar be said about a contracepted 
or other distorted sexual act? Anscombe confidently asserts that it is 
an enormously grave sin to, as she puts it, “perform a sexual act […] (what 
used to be called a venereal act, an act procuring orgasm), so that it is 
not a normal act of copulation but is per se unfitted to generate a child.”18 
In her later, much better-known paper ‘Contraception and Chastity,’ fo-
cusing specifically on acts of contracepted sex, she tells us that “contra-
ceptive intercourse within marriage is a graver offence against chastity 
than is straightforward fornication or adultery. For it is not even a proper 
act of intercourse and therefore is not a true marriage act.”19
What might be the reasoning behind this claim? Although Anscombe 
does not cite Aquinas, she is continuing in his tradition by assuming that 
every emission of seed that takes place in such a way that generation 
cannot result or suitably result is against a good of the human being. 
Deliberately acting to bring this about is sinful and sex has a teleology 
that must be respected. Aquinas notes first the case of sins against nature 
(which would include contraception) and then goes on to consider the 
case of an emission of seed that takes place in such a fashion that a child 
can indeed be conceived but appropriate education of the child has been 
impeded (Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 122.). Education of children is, 
as we’ve seen, what McCabe identifies as  the telos of  sexual or mari-
tal activity as  a  whole, and McCabe would certainly see such educa-
tion as hampered where a child is conceived by parents who have made 
no permanent commitment to each other.
 18 G. E. M. Anscombe Contraception and Natural Law, op. cit., p. 520.
 19 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, in: Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, 
Philosophy and Ethics by GEM Anscombe, eds. M. Geach, L. Gormally, Exeter 2008, p. 185.
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The passages in  the Summa Contra Gentiles make very clear that 
the good of individuals and not just societies is at stake when children 
are born from sexual acts outside the marital commitment. However, 
elsewhere (in the Summa Theologiae this time) Aquinas explains as fol-
lows the serious wrongness of sins against nature (as opposed to e.g. 
the sexual sin of normal fornication or adultery) when he addresses the 
objection that unnatural vices are not the greatest sins coming under 
the species of lust:
I answer that,  In every genus, worst of all is  the corruption of  the principle 
on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are 
according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, 
before disposing of other things according as  it is fitting. This may be observed 
both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative mat-
ters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowl-
edge  of which is  naturally bestowed on  man, so  in matters of  action  it is  most 
grave and shameful to  act  against things as  determined by  nature. Therefore, 
since by  the unnatural  vices  man  transgresses that which has been determined 
by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter 
this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above (Article 9), 
is  contrary to  the  natural   respect which we  owe  persons  related to  us. (Summa 
Theologica II-II, 154, 12)
Now someone like McCabe might object to Aquinas and Anscombe 
that their treatment of unnatural vice locates the perversion of the func-
tion of sexual intercourse primarily in the immediate physical species 
of the act chosen – and not, it might be claimed, in the telos of marital 
activity in terms of the proper nurturing and education of children, and 
the kind of spousal coupling conducive to that. And indeed, it is not 
immediately clear why concern for immediate structure should take 
priority over concern for education. After all, is not conceiving children 
outside of marriage insufficiently taking account of their welfare and 
also clearly perverting the function of sexual intercourse and in a very 
serious way?
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Telos of sex
This question fails to grasp the extent to which the unitive and pro-
creative aspects of marital sex are intimately united. We will turn to this 
shortly: at  this point it  is worth just noting that a society which nor-
malises and promotes both contraception and homosexual sex (as our 
own aggressively does) is far more likely than, say, a polygamous society 
to lose sight of the fact that sexual acts and organs have any telos at all.20)
If Aquinas is  indeed claiming that e.g. adultery (which usually in-
volves betrayal) and e.g. heterosexual incest (which involves the seri-
ous compromising of family structures and often some form of abuse), 
are somehow less basically wrong than masturbation, this does indeed 
seem a rather strange position. A more plausible claim is that the ‘over-
all’ wrongness of such acts as solitary sex is not always and everywhere 
worse than the evils involved in  the above cases. Rather, the wrongs 
involved are of a different kind and order. Analogously, bestiality does 
not harm other human beings in the same ways that adultery typically 
does, but it is nevertheless at some level more disturbing to people pre-
cisely because it is involves sexual activity that is anti-teleological to an 
extreme degree and at the most basic level. It is undermining of human 
dignity insofar as it fails to respect at all the purposes of human sexual-
ity. Similarly, incest is disturbing in terms of its blurring of fundamental 
 20 The current explosion of requests to change gender, not just from adults but from teenagers 
and even young children is a complex phenomenon, and responses to it need to bear this in mind 
(see e.g. H. Watt, Gender Transition: The Moral Meaning of Bodily and Social Presentation, ‘New 
Blackfriars,’ (forthcoming) https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12465). There are many potential causes 
but among them is the sexualisation of young people, something that causes some to retreat into 
another social gender, and the fact that society at large increasingly treats very different kinds of se-
xual act as if they were the same. Also relevant is the fact that for decades, heterosexual couples 
have treated healthy fertile functioning as something to be shunned and prevented, even by means 
of permanently disabling such functioning. We may begin with contraceptively motivated sterili-
sation, but we end with sterilisation of those who recoil from their own reproductive organs sim-
ply as such. This is not to deny that some individuals will be inherently vulnerable to developing 
distressing feelings of gender dysphoria – but it would be naive in the extreme to assume that  social 
changes are having no effect here. 
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roles and sexualisation of familial relations which, if they are to retain 
their meaning and function, will require separation from the sexual 
realm. However, even in this context, the incestuous act, although in-
volving deep harms, is not quite the same as a masturbatory act which 
does not even possess the basic teleology without which we cannot make 
sense of sexuality and its purpose and inherent meaning. The question 
is not about what causes more harm to more people, but more about the 
type of act and how it relates to our understanding of the phenomenon 
of  sexuality itself.
The adulterous act is not maritally unitive – but neither, we should 
note, is  the contracepted act even between husband and wife. When 
we  talk abstractly about the physical unity of  the marital act we  are 
simply talking about procreative striving: the bodies of even infertile 
spouses are striving towards conception in a way they have done noth-
ing to obstruct. However, if we are talking about the unitive in the rich-
est and widest human sense, the unity experienced by a good spousal 
coupling, we are talking about something of which the physical procre-
ative striving is simply a necessary aspect. This necessary aspect of the 
couple’s unity, in the richer wider sense, is not necessarily superior to it 
even though this unity is dependent upon procreative physical striving. 
My body’s overall good health is dependent upon the good health of my 
stomach, but it does not follow that my stomach is more important than 
my body’s overall health.
Similarly, if we understand the procreative good of sex in the rich hu-
man sense as something conducive to the ‘completed’ procreative good 
of bearing, rearing, and educating a child (something more like what 
McCabe calls ‘sexual activity’), then we are also talking about something 
identical to  the unitive good in  the rich sense (i.e. creating the right 
environment for child-rearing). So, the social function of the act, which 
is what we are discussing at this level, isn’t something entirely relative 
to changing cultural practices, but is rather bound up with what is truly 
good for children – for the flourishing of new human beings.
Anscombe is absolutely right, then, in flagging up the importance 
of going against the telos of sex at this most basic structural level, for the 
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identity just described makes it clear how serious is any fragmentation 
of the sexual act.
Significance of sex
And in pointing out that there is no such thing as an insignificant 
sexual act, Anscombe reveals herself as someone who understands the 
importance, with regard to every claimed ‘fragment’ of a marriage in the 
sexual arena, that it be a genuine fragment and not a mere simulacrum. 
As she puts it:
It’s so important in marriage and quite generally, simply because there just is no 
such thing as a casual, non-significant sexual act. This in turn arises from the fact 
that sex concerns the transmission of human life […] There is no such thing as a ca-
sual, non-significant sexual act; everyone knows this […] Virtue in  connection 
with eating is basically only a matter of the pattern of one’s eating habits but Virtue 
in sex – chastity – is not only a matter of such a pattern, that is of its role in a pair 
of  lives. A single sexual action can be bad even without regard to  its context, its 
further intention and its motives.21
This is certainly taking sex seriously. And indeed, in their own re-
sponse to Anscombe on contraception, Bernard Williams and Michael 
Tanner22 criticize her for calling shallow those who try to make room 
on occasion for sex as casual enjoyment, and for what they see as her 
unwarranted assumption that those doing so on occasion will necessarily 
adopt a frivolous attitude towards sex generally.
One way of answering Williams and Tanner is  to focus especially 
on marriage and say perhaps a little more about it than Anscombe does 
in her response to these authors, or  indeed to Herbert McCabe. It  is 
necessary to think not only about the point of the institution of marriage 
(in terms of nurturing children and the special friendship conducive 
 21 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 186.
 22 B. Williams, M. Tanner, Correspondence and Comments, “The Human World” 9 (1972), p. 47.
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to that), but also about the importance of keeping sex as an act which 
carries a reference, however implicit, to children, both in the way it is 
reserved to marriage and in the way it is kept ‘open to life.’
Designing Marriage
Following on from what Anscombe says about marriage and its sig-
nificance, and what McCabe rightly says about society’s own stake in the 
education of children, we might imagine trying to  ‘design’ an  institu-
tion which would best protect children’s interests and also the interests 
of their parents and more broadly of society. First by making a procre-
ative kind of act a necessary condition for a ‘complete’ marriage, a con-
summated marriage – the gateway by which one enters marriage – one 
would tie the natural and appropriate act for generating children to the 
appropriate institution for the upbringing of children. Secondly, by re-
stricting that act to the institution one would protect children against the 
possibility of their coming to be outside of the appropriate institution 
for their upbringing. Moreover, the institution of marriage sex expresses 
makes sense on account of  its relation to children in general, even if, 
by a natural accident, no children are ever born from a given marriage.
The question for a critic of this ‘designed’ institution would be, what 
is it that necessitates lifelong monogamy in marriage? Without the po-
tential relationship to children it is difficult to see 1) why the arrange-
ment should be life-long and 2) why the relationship should be restricted 
to two people. By privileging sexual intercourse within the institution 
such that the very definition of and entry to  the institution depends 
upon the marital act and vice-versa, one protects the rationale for the 
institution. When one thinks in this way, it becomes clear why every 
sexual act, just as it should take place within the institution best fitted 
for rearing children, should appropriately express the good of children 
by being ‘open to life’ (which of course, is not the same thing as being 
fertile).
In the light of  this understanding of  the institution, what should 
we say of a couple who choose to engage in what are (at some level) 
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experientially similar sexual experiences – the kinds of unnatural act 
that Anscombe takes to be gravely wrong (oral or anal sex, mutual mas-
turbation, contracepted sex)? Here, the special connection between the 
conjugal act (if seen as a sexual act not relevantly morally dissimilar 
to other consensual sex acts) and the institution of marriage becomes 
difficult to sustain. Why, for example, ought a couple who choose these 
relevantly similar forms of sex get married – a point Anscombe makes 
at the beginning of Contraception and Chastity?23
We might formulate the thought in the following, rather unAnscom-
bian way:
You ought to marry and/or favour the marriages of others because, among other 
things, you  want, or  should  want, yourselves and/or others to  engage in, procre-
ative-type sex of a socially significant and valuable kind (call it PS for short). Insofar 
as you engage in substitutionary sex (call it SS) you reduce the rationale for getting 
married in your own minds and in the minds of others.24
So if a couple are intending to gain sexual experiences through a sub-
stitutionary25 form of sex they dilute or endanger their ability to appreci-
ate the relevance of normal sexual intercourse to the institution of mar-
riage. If the couple view what I am calling their substitutionary sex as not 
relevantly similar to procreative-type sex,26 it becomes difficult to see why 
 23 G. E. M. Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, op. cit., p. 172.
 24 Of course the increased practice of substitutionary sex (SS) may not lead to a decrease, in all 
cases, of procreative-type sex (PS). But the point here is that dispositions are affected in impor-
tant ways such that the possible commitment to PS is rendered more difficult. While various kinds 
of non-sexual activity can also undermine commitment to PS, SS is especially relevant and serious 
in undermining it precisely because it is, like PS, sexual activity (see below). The argument of this 
section is adapted from A. McCarthy, Ethical Sex: Sexual Choices and Their Nature and Meaning, 
South Bend 2016.
 25 “Substitutionary” here encompasses activities which tend to engender in participants a lack 
of differentiation between that which needs to be distinguished (SS and PS) as well as activity which 
entirely ‘displaces’ PS both in terms of appreciation of its status and in the ability of practitioners 
to act upon that appreciation.
 26 James Alison, in his defence of the moral acceptability of homosexual activity, observes that 
“if it were the case that the homosexual inclination is simply a thing that just is “like that,” and is not 
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it should be restricted to the institution of marriage, any more than hav-
ing a meal with someone not one’s spouse. But of course, sexual pleasure 
is one of the things (along with structural features) that links substitution-
ary sex to procreative-type sex: it is not realistic to suppose that couples 
will treat substitutionary sex as a completely different kind of activity. 
Moreover, a question arises as to whether there is some very important 
human good which this kind of pleasure exists to serve and encourage.27
It does not appear to be a matter of mere cultural conditioning that 
for one or other spouse to engage in substitutionary sex with a third 
party is something deeply problematic for anyone committed to the in-
stitution of marriage. This, plausibly, is because such behaviour involves 
sexual activity of a type relevantly similar to procreative-type sex, even 
if not intended as such. And this point in turn may suggest a built-in 
significance to sexual activity in general. For it would appear that the 
motives of people engaging in such activity, while morally relevant, are 
not morally necessary to identify the damaging nature of such activity 
in relation to the institution of marriage.
a disfiguration of anything, in that case the official characterisation [of the Catholic Church], and 
along with it the absolute prohibition, is false.” He later adds, “if it were the case that not all human 
beings are intrinsically heterosexual, then extending the opportunity to marry to same-sex couples 
would present no threat to the existence of heterosexual marriage, and there would be no logical 
reason why same-sex couples should be deprived of that opportunity.” J. Alison, Good-faith learning 
and the fear of God, in: In Opening Up: Speaking Out in the Church, ed. J. Filichowski, P. Stanford, 
London 2005. Available at www.jamesalison.co.uk/pdf/eng17.pdf. Note however that the worldwi-
de movement for ‘gay marriage’ necessarily suggests that gay sex (and gay partnership built around 
sex) are not just “like that” i.e. they are related in important ways to heterosexual sex and marriage.
 27 It is relevant here that the sensation of orgasm is similar in SS and PS, which further sup-
ports the claim that couples are unlikely to treat SS and PS as completely separate kinds of activity. 
Indeed it is plausible to say that SS is an illusion of PS (more so in the case of contracepted heterose-
xual sex than homosexual sex) But in order to say this one needs to support the claim that the sen-
sation of pleasure is tied innately to PS. There is a plausible evolutionary story about this – namely 
that the pleasure is there to motivate PS. And while evolutionary stories aren’t conclusive teleolo-
gically (how could they be, absent further explanations?), pleasure certainly does make sense tele-
ologically if we think of it as something designed to motivate something as valuable as procreative 
activity. The orgasm, of course, distinguishes SS from handshakes (indeed, if a handshake were in-
tended to produce the same pleasure as central cases of PS, the handshake would, on this  account, 
be morally problematic).
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To return to Anscombe: like a good phenomenologist, Anscombe 
held on to the importance of what some would call mere discardable 
fragments of  the marital whole. On  the one hand, she would reject 
the radical proposal to  see individual intentional sexual acts as  not 
needing any serious meaning (as Williams and Tanner would argue 
that they do not). She realized that the further you abstract from dif-
ferent moral phenomena the easier it is to assert their identity, a beset-
ting sin of liberalism. By retaining the importance of objective bodily 
structures and all they mean as  well as  our immediate intentions 
in  the sexual arena, she honours the marital meaning of  our sexual 
acts and organs and refuses to  obscure the sui generis nature of  the 
sexual-ethical sphere.
Different phenomena
That said, there is not nothing to the charge of Williams and Tanner 
that Anscombe is wrongly assimilating homosexual (and, I would add, 
contraceptive) acts to  masturbation.28 She is  right to  make the case 
that all these come under the category of unnatural acts and she can 
reply that just because two kinds of act are said to have aspects in com-
mon this is  not necessarily to  say that they have all or  most aspects 
in common. However, she does not anywhere discuss the very different 
phenomena involved in  each and so  risks being perceived as  some-
one insensitive to  the axiological complexities raised by  these differ-
ent acts: acts which  – while all failing utterly to  constitute a  marital 
act – may be structurally alienated from such an act to greater or less-
er degrees. On  the phenomenological point, thinkers such as  Roger 
Scruton,29 Aurel Kolnai and Thomas Nagel,30 by  attending to  the na-
ture of sexual desire itself, have tried, with varying degrees of success, 
to capture some of the differences involved. None of which challenges 
 28 B. Williams, M. Tanner, Correspondence and Comments, “The Human World” 9 (1972), p. 47.
 29 Cf. R. Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation, London 2006.
 30 Cf. T. Nagel, Sexual Perversion, in: Mortal Questions, Cambridge 1979, p. 39–52.
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the truth of   Anscombe’s point with regard to  contraception and its 
intrinsic nature as  non-marital, nor the fact that the normalization 
of what Anscombe bluntly calls unnatural vice has led to devastating 
results in  terms of  people’s understanding of  the reproductive mean-
ing of sexual identity and sexual activity, something which widespread 
 fornication and adultery alone failed to achieve.
We are today surrounded by the results of decisions made by those 
who ignored Anscombe’s warnings and those of  others. Just as  what 
Anscombe calls unnatural vice is made into an acceptable part of mar-
riage, so  now society redefines marriage and in  effect, sacralises un-
natural acts and promotes them ubiquitously with those visible symbols 
of hegemony, flags inverting God’s covenant. The connection between 
widespread use of  contraception and this outcome reminds us  of 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s prophetic words. What others saw as  liberation 
of sex from procreation she saw as the removal of the thread that held 
 together the garment.
Societies and legislatures seldom remain very tolerant of views op-
posed to  their own for very long, especially when it  comes to  mar-
riage and sexual ethics. Already people who hold Anscombe’s opinions 
on marriage are under various pressures to keep quiet about such views. 
That this should happen in regard to opinions on sex in particular is it-
self evidence of the great specialness and seriousness of this area of eth-
ics, and the extent to which people’s sexual lives are seen as part of their 
identity and therefore to be defended at all costs.
As so often, Anscombe saw more clearly than most the central point 
about sexual ethics and also what was to come, when she wrote these 
words:
For we don’t invent marriage, as we may invent the terms of an association or club, 
any more than we invent human language. It is part of the creation of humanity and 
if we’re lucky we find it available to us and can enter into it. If we are very unlucky 
we may live in a society that has wrecked or deformed this human thing.
This – that the good and the point of a sexual act is marriage – is why only what 
is capable of being a marriage act is natural sex. It’s this that makes the division 
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between straightforward fornication or adultery and the wickedness of the sins  against 
nature and of contraceptive intercourse.”31
In making this point, albeit with characteristic forthrightness, An-
scombe showed a far greater concern for and love of the good of soci-
ety and her fellow-man than those who opposed her in their defence 
of  sexual acts which are in fact extreme denials of community.
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Abstract
Elizabeth Anscombe and an argument against contraception
In the 1960s, before the promulgation of Humanae Vitae, the Catholic philosophers 
Elizabeth Anscombe and Herbert McCabe OP debated whether there are convincing 
natural law arguments for the claim that contraception violates an exceptionless moral 
norm. This article revisits those arguments and critiques McCabe’s approach to natu-
ral law, concerned primarily with ‘social sin’ and not simply violations of ‘right reason,’ 
as one particularly ill-suited to addressing questions in sexual ethics and unable both 
to distinguish properly between certain forms of sexual wrongdoing and more obviously 
social sins such as theft, and also to distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ sexu-
al acts. Anscombe’s views, I argue, are closer to those of Thomas Aquinas and provide 
reasons for making the distinctions McCabe does not. An argument concerning the na-
ture of the institution of marriage and the effects of non-marital acts on that institution 
is proposed as a way of strengthening Anscombe’s argument that contraception violates 
an exceptionless moral norm.
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